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I.   INTRODUCTION 
About a month before the 2014 election, the United States Su-
preme Court issued a series of four extraordinary orders in election 
law cases. Without any explanation, the Court: stayed a district court 
order which would have required Ohio to restore extra days of early 
voting;1 stayed a Fourth Circuit order (partially reversing a district 
court) which would have restored same-day voter registration and 
the counting of certain provisional ballots in North Carolina;2 vacated 
a Seventh Circuit stay of a district court order barring Wisconsin 
from implementing its new strict voter identification law;3 and re-
fused to vacate a Fifth Circuit stay of a district court order which 
would have barred Texas from continuing to use its new strict voter 
                                                                                                                  
 * Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. 
Thanks to Will Baude, Doug Chapin, Erwin Chemerinsky, Ned Foley, Michael Gilbert, 
Linda Greenhouse, Doug Laycock, Richard Re, Michael Solimine, and Dan Tokaji for useful 
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 1. Husted v. Ohio State Conference of NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.). 
 2. North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (mem.). 
 3. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (mem.). 
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identification law.4 The district court, after a trial on the merits, had 
declared Texas’ law unconstitutional and in violation of the Voting 
Rights Act.5  
The orders appeared contradictory, for example by allowing strict 
voter identification requirements to be used on Election Day 2014 in 
Texas but not Wisconsin. But the apparent common thread, as sug-
gested by Justice Alito’s dissent from the order in the Wisconsin case6 
and by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent from the order in the Texas case,7 
was the Supreme Court’s application of “the Purcell principle:” the 
idea that courts should not issue orders which change election rules 
in the period just before the election. This idea has appeared in earli-
er Supreme Court cases, most prominently in Purcell v. Gonzalez,8 a 
2006 short per curiam case in which the Court vacated a Ninth Cir-
cuit injunction which had temporarily blocked use of Arizona’s strict 
new voter identification law. The Court in Purcell criticized the 
Ninth Circuit both for not explaining its reasoning and for issuing an 
order just before an election which could cause voter confusion and 
problems for those administering elections.9 In the 2014 election cas-
es, the Court consistently voted against changing the electoral status 
quo just before the election. Ironically, given the Court’s criticism of 
the Ninth Circuit for not giving reasons in Purcell, the Court did not 
explain its reasons in any of the 2014 election orders.  
In this Article, I argue the Supreme Court should rein in the  
Purcell principle. Certainly the potential for voter confusion and elec-
toral chaos raise a strong public interest argument against last mi-
nute changes in election rules. But under normal Supreme Court re-
medial standards for considering stays and injunctions, the effect of a 
court order on the public interest is only one factor to consider. In-
deed, in Purcell itself the Court cautioned that “considerations specif-
ic to election cases” should be a factor “in addition to [weighing] the 
harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction.”10 
Although the precise test the Court uses in these emergency situa-
tions is somewhat fluid and uncertain, there is no doubt that ordinar-
ily the Court considers the likelihood of success on the merits and 
                                                                                                                  
 4. Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.). 
 5. Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 694 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
 6. Frank, 135 S. Ct. at 7 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“There is a colorable basis for the 
Court’s decision due to the proximity of the upcoming general election. It is particularly 
troubling that absentee ballots have been sent out without any notation that proof of photo 
identification must be submitted.”). 
 7. Veasey, 135 S. Ct. at 10 (referencing and criticizing the application of the Purcell 
principle to this case). 
 8. 549 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 9. Id. at 4-5. 
 10. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
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relative hardship to the parties as two crucial factors in deciding 
whether to grant or vacate a stay or impose an injunction. By making 
the Purcell principle paramount, the Court runs the risk of issuing 
orders, which can disenfranchise voters or impose significant burdens 
on election administrators for no good reason. Had the Court applied 
all the ordinary appropriate factors for emergency relief to the four 
2014 election cases, in addition to special concerns attendant in elec-
tion cases, there is a strong argument it would have reached a differ-
ent decision in at least the Texas case and potentially in the North 
Carolina case. 
Part II of this Article explains the tests that the Court applies in 
considering emergency stays and related orders, arguing that the 
Purcell principle should properly be understood not as a stand-alone 
rule but instead as relevant to one of the factors (the public interest) 
the Court usually considers. Part III applies the proper standards to 
the four 2014 emergency election cases considered by the Supreme 
Court, arguing that the Court got it wrong in, at least, the Texas case 
and possibly in the North Carolina case. Part IV briefly argues that, 
regardless of whether the Supreme Court agrees with this call to rein 
in the Purcell principle, the Court should issue opinions, even weeks 
or months after the Court acts in an emergency elections case, ex-
plaining its reasoning. Such opinions would provide valuable guid-
ance to lower courts considering election cases and help legitimize 
the Court’s actions by making them more transparent. It also might 
discipline the Justices to decide controversial cases more consistently. 
II.   SITUATING PURCELL IN THE USUAL PRACTICE FOR EMERGENCY 
STAYS AND INJUNCTIONS AT THE SUPREME COURT  
A.   The Supreme Court’s Usual Practice for Granting Stays,  
Vacating Stays, and Issuing Injunctions 
Many Supreme Court practices and procedures are opaque and 
mysterious; the opacity recently got attention when the Court failed 
to explain its decision not to hear a large number of cases challenging 
the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans and when it failed to 
explain its emergency orders in controversial voting and abortion 
cases.11 
                                                                                                                  
 11. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court’s Actions Are Monumental, but the Why of its Rea-
soning Often Missing, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
courts_law/supreme-courts-actions-are-monumental-but-the-why-of-its-reasoning-often-
missing/2014/10/12/ca1ccc9c-4fca-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.html; Adam Liptak, Jus-
tices Drawing Dotted Lines with Terse Orders in Big Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/us/supreme-court-with-terse-orders-has-judges-and-
lawyers-reading-tea-leaves.html; Dahlia Lithwick, Injunction Junction: What is the Su-
preme Court Thinking Behind Its Unfathomable Silence?, SLATE (Oct. 16, 2014, 2:31 PM), 
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The Court’s practices and procedures for reviewing emergency 
stay and injunction requests are among the most mysterious, in part 
because the Court often decides these cases without written explana-
tion. The Court’s formal rules describe only the mechanics of seeking 
stays and other emergency relief and not the substantive standards 
of review or any requirement of an explanation. A request for emer-
gency relief ordinarily starts with an application directed to the Su-
preme Court Justice assigned as Circuit Justice to hear emergency 
matters from the Circuit. The Justice can decide the matter in cham-
bers or refer it to the full Court for decision.12 
Although the Justices have stated a variety of standards for decid-
ing on emergency matters, they share factors typical for court review 
of preliminary relief requests: likelihood of success on the merits, the 
potential for irreparable injury to both parties, and the public inter-
est. They all also give some measure of deference to the decision of 
the lower court.13 
1.   Stays.  
Perhaps the most common articulation of the standard for review-
ing a request to stay a lower court ruling is Justice Brennan’s state-
ment in the Rostker v. Goldberg case.14 Individual Justices frequently 
                                                                                                                  
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/supreme_court_ 
unsigned_orders_stays_and_injunctions_no_explanations_in_voter.html.  
 12. See SUP. CT. R. 21 (“Motions to the Court”); SUP. CT. R. 22 (“Applications to Indi-
vidual Justices”); SUP. CT. R. 23 (“Stays”); STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT 
PRACTICE § 17, at 872-910 (10th ed. 2013).  
 13. See SHAPIRO, supra note 12, § 17.II.13, at 898 (listing the factors the Court consid-
ers for stays and temporary injunctions); id. at 907-08 (“How much weight is given the 
ruling of the lower court will depend in large measure upon whether other factors to be 
considered leave the Circuit Justice certain or uncertain as to whether a stay should be 
granted. While not bound by the orders of the lower courts, the Circuit Justice will be  
inclined to accept the prior ruling if the matter is deemed a close one, but not if the balance 
of equities or the likelihood of reversal clearly call for a different result.”).  
It does not appear that the Court has ever explained how the special standards for re-
viewing requests for emergency stays, vacating stays, and granting injunctions mesh with 
the usual “abuse of discretion” standard of review that an appellate court applies to a non-
emergency review of a trial court’s decision on a preliminary injunction. 
 14. 448 U.S. 1306 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers). As Justice Brennan put it: 
The principles that control a Circuit Justice’s consideration of in-chambers 
stay applications are well established. Relief from a single Justice is appropri-
ate only in those extraordinary cases where the applicant is able to rebut the 
presumption that the decisions below—both on the merits and on the proper  
interim disposition of the case—are correct. In a case like the present one, this 
can be accomplished only if a four-part showing is made. First, it must be  
established that there is a “reasonable probability” that four Justices will  
consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari or to note proba-
ble jurisdiction. Second, the applicant must persuade me that there is a fair 
prospect that a majority of the Court will conclude that the decision below was 
erroneous. While related to the first inquiry, this question may involve some-
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have cited the Rostker standard in in-chambers opinions as Justices 
decided stay requests as a Circuit Justice.15 Only recently, however, 
did the Supreme Court explicitly cite the Rostker test as the standard 
the entire Court applies in considering whether or not to stay a lower 
court order.  
In the 2010 Hollingsworth v. Perry case,16 the Court considered a 
motion to stay a trial court order to broadcast live proceedings from 
the Proposition 8 same-sex marriage trial in San Francisco. In con-
sidering the stay request of same-sex marriage opponents, the Court 
set forth the Rostker standard: 
To obtain a stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition 
for a writ of certiorari, an applicant must show (1) a reasonable 
probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently 
meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of 
the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below; and (3) a likeli-
hood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay. In 
close cases the Circuit Justice or the Court will balance the equi-
ties and weigh the relative harms to the applicant and to the  
respondent. Lucas v. Townsend (1988) (Kennedy, J., in chambers); 
Rostker (Brennan, J., in chambers).17 
Although the Hollingsworth decision staying the trial court’s 
broadcast order split the Court 5-4, the dissenters articulated a sub-
stantially similar test for determining when the Court should grant a 
stay of a lower court order. The dissent’s main concern instead was 
                                                                                                                  
what different considerations, especially in cases presented on direct appeal. 
Third, there must be a demonstration that irreparable harm is likely to result 
from the denial of a stay. And fourth, in a close case it may be appropriate to 
“balance the equities”—to explore the relative harms to applicant and respond-
ent, as well as the interests of the public at large. 
Id. at 1308 (citations omitted).  
 15. According to a Westlaw search conducted in January 2015, Rostker has been cited 
nineteen times in Court opinions, seventeen of which were in opinions from individual 
Justices whom were sitting as a Circuit Justice. The case was cited once by Justice Bren-
nan (also joined by Justice Marshall) in a dissenting opinion from Justice Rehnquist’s deci-
sion to grant a stay. Heckler v. Lopez, 464 U.S. 879, 885 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Hollingsworth, discussed below, is the most recent Supreme Court case citing Rostker. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010) (per curiam). Justice Thomas, in a very recent 
statement joined by Justice Scalia, respected the denial of stay and also cited Hol-
lingsworth’s recitation of the Rostker standard, writing: “I join my colleagues in denying 
this application only because there appears to be no ‘reasonable probability that four Jus-
tices will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari.’ That is unfortu-
nate.” Maricopa County v. Lopez-Valenzuela, 135 S. Ct. 428, 428 (2014) (citing Hol-
lingsworth, 558 U.S. at 190). Justice Thomas’s statement was noteworthy because it made 
reference to, and criticized, the Court’s denial of certiorari in a number of same-sex mar-
riage cases. See id. For more on stay standards, see SHAPIRO, supra note 12, § 17.II.3,  
at 877-78. 
 16. 558 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 17. Id. at 190 (citing Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1988) (Kennedy, J., in 
chambers); Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers)).  
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with application of the test to the facts of the case. Justice Breyer for 
the dissenters stated the applicable test as follows: 
The Court agrees that it can issue this extraordinary legal re-
lief only if (1) there is a fair chance the District Court was wrong 
about the underlying legal question, (2) that legal question meets 
this Court’s certiorari standards, (3) refusal of the relief would 
work “irreparable harm,” (4) the balance of the equities (including, 
the Court should say, possible harm to the public interest) favors 
issuance, (5) the party’s right to the relief is “clear and undisputa-
ble,” and (6) the “question is of public importance” (or otherwise 
“peculiarly appropriate” for such action).18 
2.   Vacating Stays.  
The Court’s standard for vacating a lower court stay appears simi-
lar to the standard for granting stays. However, the in-chambers 
Western Airline opinion of Justice O’Connor19 and the in-chambers 
Coleman opinion of then-Justice Rehnquist20 state that a Justice 
should show great deference to a lower court (or at least a Court of 
Appeals)21 which has granted a stay. Circuit Justices asked to vacate 
a lower court stay have cited this standard in in-chambers opinions, 
but these opinions have not yet been cited in a majority Supreme 
Court opinion.22  
However, the Court has come close. In a 2013 case, Planned 
Parenthood v. Abbott,23 the Court denied a request to vacate a stay of 
a trial court injunction limiting Texas’ ability to implement some new 
Texas abortion restrictions that the Fifth Circuit had ordered. The 
Fifth Circuit’s stay kept the restrictions in place pending further  
litigation in the lower courts. 
 Justice Scalia (in a concurring statement for himself, Justice 
Alito, and Justice Thomas) relied on Western Airlines and Coleman in 
explaining the standard the Court should apply when asked to vacate 
                                                                                                                  
 18. Id. at 199 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer cited the majority’s standard and 
Rostker as the appropriate standard. Id. The Justices also discussed the standards for the 
Court’s mandamus power, an issue that is beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at 190.  
 19. W. Airlines, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 480 U.S. 1301, 1305 
(1987) (O’Connor, J., in chambers). 
 20. Coleman v. PACCAR, Inc., 424 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., in  
chambers). 
 21. I was unable to find any cases discussing whether the same standard of deference 
should apply when a trial court stays its own order and an appellate court refuses to vacate 
the stay. 
 22. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Campbell, 508 U.S. 1301 (1993) (O’Connor, J., in chambers) 
(citing Coleman); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 469 U.S. 1311 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers) 
(citing Coleman); see also Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (Alito, J., joined by Scalia, 
J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing W. Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 1305).  
 23. 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013). 
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the Fifth Circuit stay: “We may not vacate a stay entered by a court 
of appeals unless that court clearly and ‘ “demonstrably” ’ erred in its 
application of ‘ “accepted standards.” ’ ” 24 
Justice Breyer in his dissent in Planned Parenthood also relied on 
Western Airlines and Coleman in setting forth the standard: 
This Court may vacate a stay entered by a court of appeals 
where the case “ ‘could and very likely would be reviewed here up-
on final disposition in the court of appeals,’ ” “ ‘the rights of the 
parties . . . may be seriously and irreparably injured by the stay,’ ” 
and “ ‘the court of appeals is demonstrably wrong in its application 
of accepted standards in deciding to issue the stay.’ ”25  
The Justices in Planned Parenthood emphasized different aspects 
of the Western Airlines/Coleman test. Justice Breyer mentioned con-
sideration of the parties’ serious and irreparable injury, absent from 
Justice Scalia’s formulation, which focused on demonstrable error.26  
Whether or not there are appreciable differences in how the Jus-
tices view the Western Airlines/Coleman standard27 (and certainly 
there are differences in application of the standard), both Justice 
Scalia and Justice Beyer agreed28 that in determining whether the 
Court of Appeals has made a “demonstrable error” in applying “ac-
cepted standards” for the granting of a stay, the Court will examine 
whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the stay standards the 
Court set out in its 2009 Nken v. Holder case:  
(1) [W]hether the stay applicant has made a strong showing 
that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant 
will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance  
of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested  
in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. There  
is substantial overlap between these and the factors governing  
preliminary injunctions; not because the two are one and the same, 
                                                                                                                  
 24. Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting W. Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 1305 (O’Connor, 
J., in chambers) (quoting Coleman, 424 U.S. at 1304 (Rehnquist, J., in chambers))).  
 25. Id. at 508-09 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 1305).    
 26. Id. at 506, 509. 
 27. See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U.  
J. L. & LIBERTY 1, 13 & n.38 (2015) (noting the lack of clarity over whether Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion disagreed with Justice Scalia’s opinion on whether a state necessarily 
suffers irreparable injury when the state cannot enforce its laws). 
 28. Planned Parenthood, 134 S. Ct. at 506 (Scalia J., concurring) (“When deciding 
whether to issue a stay, the Fifth Circuit had to consider [Nken’s] four factors . . . .”); id.  
at 509 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Given these considerations, in my view, the standard  
governing the Fifth Circuit’s decision whether to stay the District Court’s injunction was 
not satisfied, and the standard governing this Court’s decision whether to vacate the Fifth 
Circuit’s stay is satisfied.” (first citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009); then citing 
W. Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 1305)). 
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but because similar concerns arise whenever a court order may  
allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of that  
action has been conclusively determined.  
The first two factors of the traditional standard are the most 
critical.29  
3.   Issuing Interlocutory Injunctions.  
Finally, as noted in Nken,30 the Supreme Court applies a similar 
standard to the stay standard in considering requests for an injunc-
tion before a final judgment. This point is worth considering because 
the Court at least once has enjoined a local election after lower courts 
have declined to do so.31 The Court has held that a request for such 
an injunction “ ‘demands a significantly higher justification’ than a 
request for a stay, because unlike a stay, an injunction ‘does not 
simply suspend judicial alteration of the status quo but grants judi-
cial intervention that has been withheld by lower courts.’ ”32  
There are many in-chambers opinions from Justices (though ap-
parently no majority opinion for the Court) stating that the right to 
an injunction from the Supreme Court must be “indisputably clear” 
before a Justice will grant it.33  
As with the Court’s decisions on granting stays and vacating 
stays, a court decision to grant an injunction requires looking at the 
merits, the harm to the parties, and the public interest. As the Court 
stated in its 2008 Winter case, “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary in-
junction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, 
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of prelimi-
nary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 
injunction is in the public interest.”34 
                                                                                                                  
 29. 556 U.S. at 434 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 30. See id. (“There is substantial overlap between these [stay standards] and the fac-
tors governing preliminary injunctions . . . .”). 
 31. Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1988) (Kennedy, J., in chambers) (enjoin-
ing local election when date of election had not been precleared as required by section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act and lower court made “most problematic” conclusion under Supreme 
Court precedent that changing the date of the local election need not be precleared under 
section 5). 
 32. Respect Me. PAC v. McKee, 562 U.S. 996, 996 (2010) (quoting Ohio Citizens for 
Responsible Energy, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 479 U.S. 1312, 1313 (1986)); see 
also SHAPIRO, supra note 12, § 17.II.4, at 878-80 (noting that several Justices have  
explained that an injunction requires a greater justification than a stay). 
 33. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 507 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1993) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., in chambers); Ohio Citizens, 479 U.S. at 1313; Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 
409 U.S. 1235, 1235 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).  
 34. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
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4.   The Common Standards and the Reality of Emergency Orders 
in Contentious Cases.  
Although the Supreme Court standards for (1) granting a stay, (2) 
vacating a stay, and (3) issuing an injunction differ somewhat in 
terms of the burden placed on the party seeking relief and the defer-
ence owed to the lower court, the standards all weigh the same issues 
of likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury to the par-
ties, and the public interest.  
How important is each of these factors relative to each other, and 
how does deference to lower courts play into the Court’s decision? It 
is hard to say as a general matter, especially when many of these or-
ders lack accompanying opinions. It appears, however, that the Jus-
tices’ views as to the merits of the parties’ claims loom heavily in 
many of the cases, as does a desire to avoid changing the status quo 
or making major legal pronouncements in some controversial cases in 
which the issue is before the Court on an expedited and emergency 
basis and perhaps likely to return soon on a fuller record.  
Consider, for example, the Court’s order issued a few days after 
the final opinion day of the October 2013 term involving religious ex-
emptions to the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate. In 
Wheaton College v. Burwell,35 the Supreme Court issued an injunc-
tion allowing a religious college not to use a form prescribed by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to let the Depart-
ment know of the College’s religious objections to contraception cov-
erage through its insurance plan so long as the College “informs the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services in writing that it is a non-
profit organization that holds itself out as religious and has religious 
objections to providing coverage for contraceptive services.”36 The 
Court noted that lower courts had divided on the question whether 
such an accommodation was required, and the Court cautioned that 
“this order should not be construed as an expression of the Court’s 
views on the merits.”37 It was an odd statement given that the test for 
granting an injunction requires considering the likelihood of success 
on the merits and given some authority for the standard that peti-
tioners’ right to relief be “indisputably clear.”38 
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting for herself and Justices Ginsburg 
and Kagan, argued that the Court did not follow its usual skeptical 
standards for issuing an injunction: 
                                                                                                                  
 35. 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).  
 36. Id. at 2807. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See cases cited supra note 33.  
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Even if one accepts Wheaton’s view that the self-certification 
procedure violates RFRA, that would not justify the Court’s action 
today. The Court grants Wheaton a form of relief as rare as it is 
extreme: an interlocutory injunction under the All Writs Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1651, blocking the operation of a duly enacted law and 
regulations, in a case in which the courts below have not yet adju-
dicated the merits of the applicant’s claims and in which those 
courts have declined requests for similar injunctive relief. Injunc-
tions of this nature are proper only where “the legal rights at issue 
are indisputably clear.” Yet the Court today orders this extraordi-
nary relief even though no one could credibly claim Wheaton’s 
right to relief is indisputably clear.39 
The short but controversial order and dissent left Professor Rich-
ard Re scratching his head as to why the Court majority in Wheaton 
College did not even discuss the applicable standard of review40 and 
whether the “indisputably clear” standard might apply only to in-
chambers, and not full Court, injunctions.41  
The Justices’ concerns about the merits may have explained the 
result: all the conservative Justices apparently agreed with (or at 
least did not publicly dissent from) the Court’s order granting the 
injunction; all of the liberal Justices (aside from Justice Breyer) ex-
pressly stated their disagreement with the order in Justice So-
tomayor’s dissent.42 This tracked the division in the Court’s recent 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.43 case raising similar issues and 
offering a similar split. Or perhaps, as Professor Will Baude suggests,  
                                                                                                                  
 39. 134 S. Ct. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 40. See Richard M. Re, What Standard of Review Did the Court Apply in Wheaton 
College?, RE’S JUDICATA (July 5, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/ 
2014/07/05/what-standard-of-review-did-the-court-apply-in-wheaton-college/. 
 41. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist succinctly stated the stringent standard he used in 
deciding whether to issue an injunction pending appeal in another election case: 
An injunction pending appeal barring the enforcement of an Act of Con-
gress would be an extraordinary remedy, particularly when this Court recently 
held BCRA facially constitutional and when a unanimous three-judge District 
Court rejected applicant’s request for a preliminary injunction. The All Writs 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), is the only source of this Court’s authority to issue 
such an injunction. That authority is to be used “sparingly and only in the most 
critical and exigent circumstances.” It is only appropriately exercised where (1) 
“Necessary or appropriate in aid of [our] jurisdictio[n],” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), 
and (2) the legal rights at issue are “indisputably clear.”  
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 542 U.S. 1305, 1305-06 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., in cham-
bers) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 42. 134 S. Ct. at 2807-15. 
 43. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
2016]  REINING IN THE PURCELL PRINCIPLE 437 
 
the Court decided that preserving the status quo was more important 
than applying the usual test.44 We do not know because the Court did 
not tell us. 
B.   Fitting Purcell into the Supreme Court’s Usual Practice  
As in Wheaton College, the Supreme Court in Purcell v. Gonzalez45 
declined to opine on the merits of the case involving Arizona’s voter 
identification law. The Court noted that disputes over voter identifi-
cation laws are “hotly contested,” declaring: “We underscore that we 
express no opinion here on the correct disposition, after full briefing 
and argument.”46 This was not the only unusual thing about how the 
Supreme Court handled the Purcell case. 
Purcell arose out of a ballot initiative, Proposition 200, which  
Arizona voters approved in 2004. The measure required proof of  
citizenship upon registering to vote and presentation of certain forms 
of identification to cast an in-person ballot on Election Day.47 After 
the United States Department of Justice precleared the Arizona law 
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, a group of individuals and 
organizations opposed to the law filed a federal lawsuit in May 2006.  
On September 11, 2006, the trial court denied the challengers’  
request for a preliminary injunction, without issuing findings of facts 
or conclusions of law. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of a preliminary 
injunction to the Ninth Circuit, which set a briefing schedule that 
would have concluded two weeks after the November 7, 2006 election. 
Plaintiffs then requested an injunction pending appeal from the 
Ninth Circuit preventing the State from enforcing the voter identifi-
cation requirement at the November 7 election. On October 5,  
[A]fter receiving lengthy written responses from the State and the 
county officials but without oral argument, the panel issued a four-
                                                                                                                  
 44. Baude, supra note 27, at 11-12. 
On one hand, they seem to have been motivated by a common-sense desire to 
preserve the status quo. But the Court has rules for these things, and it is not 
easy to tell how they permitted these orders. For instance, in her Wheaton  
College dissent, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that members of the majority 
had previously written that an injunction could issue only if the plaintiffs’ enti-
tlement to relief was “indisputably clear.” The majority seemed to reject this 
standard by protesting that its “order should not be construed as an expression 
of the Court’s views on the merits,” but did not explain more. The Court issued 
a four-paragraph unsigned opinion that left the legal standard and its legal  
basis a mystery. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 45. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam). The facts described in the next few paragraphs 
appear in similar form in Purcell. Id. at 2-4. 
 46. Id. at 5. 
 47. Under the law, a voter who voted early did not need to present identification. Id. 
at 2.   
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sentence order enjoining Arizona from enforcing Proposition 200’s 
provisions pending disposition, after full briefing, of the appeals of 
the denial of a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals of-
fered no explanation or justification for its order. Four days later, 
the court denied a motion for reconsideration. [Yet again the 
Court] gave no rationale for [its] decision.48 
Despite the time-sensitive nature of the proceedings and the 
pendency of a request for emergency relief in the Court of Appeals, 
the District Court did not issue its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law until October 12. It then concluded that “plaintiffs have 
shown a possibility of success on the merits of some of their argu-
ments but the Court cannot say that at this stage they have shown 
a strong likelihood.” The District Court then found the balance of 
the harms and the public interest counseled in favor of denying the 
injunction.49 
Arizona and county officials moved to stay the Ninth Circuit’s 
grant of an injunction.50 The Supreme Court construed the filings as 
a petition for certiorari, granted the petition, and vacated the order of 
the Court of Appeals,51 a rare enough event that Professor Orin Kerr 
referred to it as equivalent to a judicial bolt of lightning.52 
In analyzing whether the Ninth Circuit erred in granting a stay, 
the Supreme Court began with a paragraph that seemed deliberately 
drafted to present both sides of the contentious debate over voter 
identification laws.53 (Elsewhere, I have criticized one statement in 
this paragraph, as unsupported by citation or empirical evidence, 
                                                                                                                  
 48. Id. at 3.  
 49. Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted). 
 50. Id. at 2. 
 51. Id.   
 52. Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Allows Voter ID Law, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 20, 
2006, 5:05 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1161378321.shtml.  
 53.    
  A State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of 
its election process. Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is  
essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy. Voter fraud drives 
honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our  
government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by 
fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised. [T]he right of suffrage can be denied 
by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively 
as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise. Countering the 
State’s compelling interest in preventing voter fraud is the plaintiffs’ strong  
interest in exercising the fundamental political right to vote. Although the like-
ly effects of Proposition 200 are much debated, the possibility that qualified 
voters might be turned away from the polls would caution any district judge to 
give careful consideration to the plaintiffs’ challenges. 
Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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suggesting that voter identification laws promote voter confidence 
and that voters “who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by 
fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised.”)54 
The Court then stated the basis for staying the Ninth Circuit’s or-
der and vacating the injunction: 
Faced with an application to enjoin operation of voter identifi-
cation procedures just weeks before an election, the Court of Ap-
peals was required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant 
upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations spe-
cific to election cases and its own institutional procedures. Court 
orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can them-
selves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain 
away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will in-
crease. So the Court of Appeals may have deemed this considera-
tion to be grounds for prompt action. Furthermore, it might have 
given some weight to the possibility that the nonprevailing parties 
would want to seek en banc review. In the Ninth Circuit that pro-
cedure, involving voting by all active judges and an en banc hear-
ing by a court of 15, can consume further valuable time. These 
considerations, however, cannot be controlling here. It was still 
necessary, as a procedural matter, for the Court of Appeals to give 
deference to the discretion of the District Court. We find no indica-
tion that it did so, and we conclude this was error. 
Although at the time the Court of Appeals issued its order the 
District Court had not yet made factual findings to which the 
Court of Appeals owed deference, by failing to provide any factual 
findings or indeed any reasoning of its own the Court of Appeals 
left this Court in the position of evaluating the Court of Appeals’ 
bare order in light of the District Court’s ultimate findings. There 
has been no explanation given by the Court of Appeals showing the 
ruling and findings of the District Court to be incorrect. In view of 
the impending election, the necessity for clear guidance to the 
State of Arizona, and our conclusion regarding the Court of  
Appeals’ issuance of the order we vacate the order of the Court of 
Appeals. 
We underscore that we express no opinion here on the correct 
disposition, after full briefing and argument, of the appeals from 
the District Court’s September 11 order or on the ultimate resolu-
tion of these cases. As we have noted, the facts in these cases are 
hotly contested, and “[n]o bright line separates permissible elec-
tion-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements.” Giv-
                                                                                                                  
 54. Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32, 35-
36 (2007); see Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Essay, Vote Fraud in the Eye of 
the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Require-
ments, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2008) (finding that voter confidence in the electoral process 
is not correlated with the presence or absence of voter identification laws in the state). 
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en the imminence of the election and the inadequate time to re-
solve the factual disputes, our action today shall of necessity allow 
the election to proceed without an injunction suspending the voter 
identification rules.55 
This was the entirety of the Supreme Court’s substantive analysis. 
Justice Stevens issued a three-sentence concurrence noting the fac-
tual disputes over the extent of disenfranchisement and fraud and 
stating that the Court’s order “will provide the courts with a better 
record on which to judge their constitutionality.”56 
The Purcell decision is both overdetermined and undertheorized. 
We do not know how much the case turned upon the failure of the 
Ninth Circuit to give reasons for its order (despite the trial court’s 
failure to make timely factual findings and issue conclusions of law 
for the Ninth Circuit to review) and how much turned on the Ninth 
Circuit’s failure to take into account “considerations specific to elec-
tion cases and its own institutional procedures.”57 On considerations 
specific to election cases, the Court mentioned both the potential for 
voter confusion which could depress turnout and the State of Arizo-
na’s need for “clear guidance” to run its election.58 
We also do not know how much the close timing of the election, 
combined with the possibility of en banc review, mattered. The Court 
wrote only that the Ninth Circuit “might” have taken the possibility 
of further review into account in drafting its order.59 Arizona in its 
filing asked the Court to apply the Coleman “demonstrably wrong” 
test in the case,60 but the Court in Purcell did not cite Coleman or  
apply it. 
Even though the Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for its failure 
to give reasons or to defer to the district court (even in the absence of 
the district court’s factual findings), the Court itself refused to weigh 
in on the merits of the parties’ arguments.61 This agnosticism, like in 
Wheaton College, appears to violate the Court’s own standards for a 
stay. Under Rostker, the Court should have considered the likelihood 
that the challengers could have successfully challenged the law as 
well as the potential irreparable injury to all the parties and to the 
public interest. 
                                                                                                                  
 55. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4-6 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 56. Id. at 6 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 57. Id. at 4.  
 58. Id. at 5.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Application for Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal at 10, Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 
F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-16702, 06-16706). 
 61. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5. 
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The Court was right to note special considerations in election cas-
es, what I call “the Purcell principle.” When the rules for elections 
change, voters may not only be confused; they can be disenfranchised 
(for example, by not having the right documentation or showing up at 
the wrong polling place). Further, electoral chaos can ensue when 
election officials face conflicting court orders on how to run an elec-
tion. Adding, removing, or changing election procedures just before 
the election can be difficult. Professional election administrators, es-
pecially in large jurisdictions, rely on cadres of poll worker volunteers 
who must be trained. It is tough to retrain these workers on new 
rules or procedures close to the election and to produce appropriate 
new written instructions the period just before the election—
especially in jurisdictions using multiple languages. 
These special concerns in election cases should have counted to-
ward the public interest factor in the Court’s Rostker test. But these 
considerations should not have been considered while disregarding 
the other traditional factors for granting or denying preliminary re-
lief: the likelihood of success on the merits and the relative hardship 
to the parties. The Court acknowledged that point by noting that it 
was raising special election-related considerations “in addition to the 
harms attendant upon the issuance or nonissuance of an injunction.”62 
Two examples demonstrate why courts should consider all rele-
vant factors (likelihood of success on the merits, relative irreparable 
harm to the parties, and the public interest) in deciding whether to 
grant a stay or other preliminary relief: 
Example 1: A local city council passes an ordinance requiring 
voters to pay a poll tax in city elections one month before the elec-
tion. A group of voters goes to court to have the poll tax declared 
unconstitutional. A week before the election, a court issues an in-
junction preventing the city from enforcing the poll tax. Before the 
court order, all poll workers had been sent instructions on how to 
implement the poll tax. The city seeks a stay from an appellate 
court. 
Example 2: Plaintiffs bring a complex challenge arguing that 
parts of a state legislative redistricting plan violate section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act. Two months before the election, when cam-
paigns are underway and ballots have been printed, a federal court 
in a split decision determines that some of the districts violate the 
Act and must be redrawn. The court issues an order requiring that 
elections be run under new district lines, with a new candidate res-
idency period and new ballots. Whether the court properly inter-
preted section 2 is uncertain. The State seeks a stay from the Su-
preme Court to run elections under the old lines. 
                                                                                                                  
 62. Id. at 4. 
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In both examples, the Purcell principle, applied to its fullest, 
would tell the courts to stay the lower court’s order because we are in 
the period just before the election, when voters can be confused and 
election administrators burdened by election changes. However, 
these public interest concerns, while relevant, should not be the sole 
consideration.  
In Example 1, the poll tax has been unconstitutional on the state 
and local level since the 1966 Supreme Court opinion in Harper v. 
Virginia State Board of Elections.63 Therefore, the challengers’ chanc-
es of success on the merits are 100 percent, and that should be a ma-
jor factor in favor of the lower court injunction and against a stay. 
Further, a poll tax imposes a huge burden on poor voters who could 
be disenfranchised by the tax, making the irreparable injury on the 
challengers’ side greater. Despite timing close to the election, and 
any hassle for election administrators to change instructions for run-
ning the election, the lower court should enjoin the poll tax and an 
appellate court should not stay such an order. Even a Supreme Court 
inclined to usually follow the Purcell principle would likely give way 
in a case like this one. 
In Example 2, the likelihood of success on the merits is uncertain. 
Further, there are great reliance interests in running elections under 
the already-declared lines. Voters, candidates, and others cam-
paigned under the old district lines. It is not just a question of elec-
tion administrators being inconvenienced but also of disrupting set-
tled expectations throughout the jurisdiction. Minority voters may 
have less effective votes in these districts, but they are not literally 
disenfranchised. With an election looming, courts should make their 
changes effective for the next election cycle. This is precisely what 
the courts did in the 1960s redistricting cases when the Court  
declared elections from substantially unequal districts to be uncon-
stitutional.64 Timing matters much more here, as do reliance inter-
                                                                                                                  
 63. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 64. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964) (“We feel that the District Court in 
this case acted in a most proper and commendable manner. It initially acted wisely in de-
clining to stay the impending primary election in Alabama, and properly refrained from 
acting further until the Alabama Legislature had been given an opportunity to remedy the 
admitted discrepancies in the State’s legislative apportionment scheme, while initially 
stating some of its views to provide guidelines for legislative action. And it correctly recog-
nized that legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration 
and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature 
fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after 
having had an adequate opportunity to do so. Additionally, the court below acted with 
proper judicial restraint, after the Alabama Legislature had failed to act effectively in rem-
edying the constitutional deficiencies in the State’s legislative apportionment scheme, in 
ordering its own temporary reapportionment plan into effect, at a time sufficiently early to 
permit the holding of elections pursuant to that plan without great difficulty, and in pre-
scribing a plan admittedly provisional in purpose so as not to usurp the primary responsi-
bility for reapportionment which rests with the legislature.”); see also Riley v. Kennedy, 
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ests, as measured against uncertain success on the merits. The court 
likely should not make any changes close to the election. 
 It would be a much harder case, however, if the courts had de-
termined that the State’s section 2 liability was clearly established. 
In that case the merits would point strongly in one direction and the 
other factors strongly in the other. In such a case, the timing and dis-
ruption issues seem important, as does the judgment of the lower 
court as to what is feasible in terms of election administration chang-
es in the period just before the election. 
All of this complex balancing was missing in Purcell. The Court 
not only ignored the likelihood of success on the merits; it affirma-
tively refused to take a position on it.65 It did not look at harms to the 
parties aside from the public interest in not changing the rules close 
to an election.66 
It is certainly understandable that the Court in Purcell avoided 
saying anything on the merits, given how controversial voter identifi-
cation laws were and are. The next time the Court considered a voter 
identification law, in the 2008 Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board case,67 the Court divided 3-3-3 in setting forth the constitu-
tional standard and applying that standard to review Indiana’s voter 
identification law. As we will see in the next Part, if and when the 
Court considers these issues on the merits, it is likely to divide along 
ideological lines once again. 
But in eschewing discussion of the merits and of the relative ir-
reparable harms to the challengers and to the State of Arizona (aside 
from its incorporation in the special election considerations), the 
Court in Purcell deviated from its normal (stated) practice for emer-
gency relief, raising risks to both voters and those who run elections.  
There is one benefit to strict application of the Purcell principle: it 
cabins some discretion of lower court judges through a per se rule to 
not allow last-minute judicial changes to election rules. That could be 
a benefit in highly charged political cases, but the price is too high, as 
it requires courts to ignore other important factors in deciding 
whether to grant extraordinary relief. Further, if we do not trust the 
courts to fairly decide cases on emergency measures for elections, 
why should we trust courts to fairly decide cases on other controver-
sial issues, like abortion or religious exemptions to health care?  
In sum, the Court correctly drew attention to special questions of 
timing before elections. But the Purcell principle needs to be domes-
                                                                                                                  
553 U.S. 406, 409 (2008) (“[P]ractical considerations sometimes require courts to allow 
elections to proceed despite pending legal challenges.”). 
 65. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5. 
 66. See id. 
 67. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).  
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ticated. Courts (including the Supreme Court) should consider the 
likelihood of success on the merits, potential irreparable harm to both 
sides, and other public interest factors in deciding whether or not to 
issue orders affecting elections in the period close to the election. 
When both the likelihood of success and irreparable harm point in 
the same direction, this is a strong argument for the Court to rule in that 
direction regardless of the direction pointed by the Purcell principle. 
The parties’ diligence is also relevant. In Purcell, the challengers 
waited months (and two elections) before seeking a preliminary in-
junction. Consideration of laches would be appropriate.68 Further, 
courts should consider whether it might be possible to run elections 
using the rules already set by election officials but with the use  
of provisional ballots to resolve disputes after the election.69 On the 
other hand, doing so would put even greater pressure on courts decid-
ing issues post-election, when the decision is more likely to be out-
come determinative.70 
In sum, the Supreme Court should adjudicate its election disputes 
consistent with the general standards and levels of deference it has 
established for considering non-election requests to stay a lower court 
order, vacate a lower court stay, or issue an injunction in its own 
right. Special considerations related to elections should be one, but 
not a dominating, factor. Adherence to the usual rules makes it less 
likely the Court will be fully swayed by perceived differences in the 
merits in these highly political and ideologically-charged cases. 
III.   PROPERLY APPLYING USUAL SUPREME COURT PRACTICE  
TO THE 2014 EMERGENCY ELECTION CASES  
A.   The Reason for the Flurry of Election 2014 Emergency Cases 
The spate of emergency election cases reaching the Supreme 
Court in the fall of 2014 was unsurprising for those in the election 
law field. Since the disputed 2000 election, culminating in the  
Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Bush v. Gore71 ending the 
Florida recount and ensuring George W. Bush’s ascendance to the 
                                                                                                                  
 68. For an argument on an increased use of laches in election cases, see Richard L. 
Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid 
Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 998-99 (2005). 
 69. For more on the potential for increased use of provisional ballots, see Edward B. 
Foley & Joshua A. Douglas, Opinion, Election 2014: The Vote You Save May Be Your Own, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/opinion/elections-2014-the-
vote-you-save-may-be-your-own.html?_r=0. 
 70. See Hasen, supra note 68, at 991-99 (arguing for courts, if possible, to resolve elec-
tion disputes before, rather than after, an election to avoid just such a problem). 
 71. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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presidency,72 the amount of election legislation and litigation has in-
creased markedly. Litigation has more than doubled in the post-2000 
period compared to the pre-2000 period.73 Among other things, this 
period of the Voting Wars has seen Republican state legislatures pass 
laws which have made it more difficult to register and vote and  
Democratic state legislatures pass laws which have made it easier to 
vote.74 Cries (often unsubstantiated) of great problems with voter 
fraud and voter suppression fill not only the airwaves and internet 
but also courthouses across the country as laws have been  
challenged. 
The latest wave of litigation follows the Supreme Court’s 2008  
decision in the Crawford case rejecting a facial challenge under the 
Equal Protection Clause to Indiana’s voter identification law75 and 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the 2013 Shelby County v. Holder 
case76 effectively removing a provision of the Voting Rights Act re-
quiring jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination in voting 
from getting preclearance from the federal government before mak-
ing any changes in their voting rules.77  
In the wake of these decisions, both jurisdictions which were sub-
ject to preclearance (Texas) and those not subject to preclearance but 
under Republican control (Wisconsin) passed stricter voter identifica-
tion and other restrictive election laws.78 When preclearance ended, 
Texas put its stalled voter identification law into immediate effect, a 
law which had been blocked first by the Department of Justice and 
then denied preclearance by a federal court in Washington, D.C.79 
North Carolina, which used to be partially covered by preclearance, 
passed the strictest set of voting rules since the passage of the 1965 
Voting Rights Act.80 Among other things, the law ended same-day 
                                                                                                                  
 72. For a chronology of the events, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS 11-40 
(2012). 
 73. RICHARD L. HASEN, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: LEGISLATION, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION, AND ELECTION LAW 304 (2014). 
 74. See generally Hasen, supra note 68 (describing efforts to change election rules on a 
partisan basis in states across the United States). 
 75. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 76. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 77. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713 (2014) (describing and analyzing the Shelby County  
decision). 
 78. See Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars Heat Up: Will the Supreme Court Allow 
States to Restrict Voting for Partisan Advantage?, SLATE (Sept. 29, 2014, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/voting_restrictions_
may_reach_the_supreme_court_from_ohio_wisconsin_north.html. 
 79. Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117, 127 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 80. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About 
Republican Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. 
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voter registration, cut back on early voting, stopped the counting of 
provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct (even if the result of 
pollworker error), imposed a new voter identification requirement 
(but not to be put into effect until the 2016 elections), and made other 
changes making it harder to register and to vote.81 In Ohio, the state 
legislature cut back on the amount of early voting, after an earlier 
attempt to do so was blocked by a federal court.82 
Federal challenges to the new voting restrictions raised two main 
claims83: that these laws violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
and that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Pro-
tection Clause.84 Both claims posed significant challenges for plain-
tiffs. Ever since the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Thornburg v. 
Gingles,85 section 2 had been widely used in the redistricting context 
to challenge a jurisdiction’s failure to create enough majority-
minority districts.86 However, section 2 had not been used much (or 
at least with much success) to challenge election administration rules 
such as voter identification, in what Professor Dan Tokaji has aptly 
named the “new vote denial” cases.87 Further, since Crawford, consti-
tutional equal protection challenges to voter identification laws 
seemed difficult for plaintiffs to win under the sliding scale approach 
endorsed by the three Justices in the middle of the Supreme Court.88  
                                                                                                                  
L. REV. F. 58 (2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/01/race-or-party-how-courts-should-
think-about-republican-efforts-to-make-it-harder-to-vote-in-north-carolina-and-elsewhere/. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ohio 
2014); Obama for Am. v. Husted, 888 F. Supp. 2d 897 (S.D. Ohio 2012), aff’d, 697 F.3d 423 
(6th Cir. 2012).  
 83. Some of the challengers to these laws raised state law claims. For example, chal-
lengers to Pennsylvania’s laws succeeded in having the law temporarily blocked on state 
law grounds upon demonstrating that Pennsylvania’s Department of Transportation was 
not up to the task of getting identification cards into the hands of voters who wanted them 
in time for the 2012 elections. After a state trial court held that the law violated the state 
constitution, the State chose not to appeal. Martha T. Moore, Pennsylvania Drops  
Court Effort to Save Voter ID Law, USA TODAY (May 8, 2014, 5:34 PM), 
http://onpolitics.usatoday.com/2014/05/08/pennsylvania-drops-effort-to-save-voter-id-law/. I 
ignore these state claims here, as they generally do not end up before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding that Florida Supreme Court’s decision 
to order statewide recount of undervotes pursuant to state law created a federal equal pro-
tection violation). 
 84. In Texas’ case, challengers also argued that the law was an unconstitutional poll 
tax, a theory the trial court accepted. See infra note 100. 
 85. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 86. See HASEN, supra note 73, at 280-88. 
 87. Id. at 288-92; see Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform 
Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006). 
 88. On the uncertainty of the balancing test, see Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward 
B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological 
Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 507 (2008); Justin Levitt, 
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As Republican-dominated states enacted identification laws stricter 
than Indiana’s, however, some plaintiffs had new hopes equal protec-
tion challenges could succeed.89 
B.   The Ohio, North Carolina, Wisconsin,  
and Texas Emergency Cases 
The four cases that made it to the Supreme Court—Ohio, North 
Carolina, Wisconsin, and Texas—each raised both section 2 Voting 
Rights Act claims and equal protection claims. Below, I briefly de-
scribe the claims and their likelihood of success, leaving a fuller dis-
cussion of the merits of the claims to another time. 
1.   Ohio.  
Ohio’s case appeared to be the weakest on the merits, yet it  
succeeded in both the federal district court and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit before being reversed by the 
Supreme Court.90 Plaintiffs challenged Ohio’s cutback on early voting 
from thirty-five days to twenty-eight days, including the elimination 
of “Golden Week,” a week’s period in which voters could both register 
to vote and cast an early vote in the same transaction. The Republi-
can legislature passed the measure after an earlier attempt to cut 
back on early voting failed in 2012. In that first cutback, the legisla-
ture (apparently inadvertently) cut back on the last weekend of early 
voting for all voters except certain military and overseas voters. A 
federal district court held that this disparate treatment violated 
equal protection. 
In the new challenge, plaintiffs appeared before the same district 
court judge as in the 2012 case, and the judge held the new cutback 
violated both the Equal Protection Clause and section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act. Minority voters were especially likely to use both early 
voting and Golden Week, and the judge found the cutbacks illegal. 
The district court, relying in part on Ohio’s decision to cut back early 
voting (as opposed to analyzing the total amount of early voting Ohio 
offered under the new law), found both constitutional and voting 
rights violations. The trial judge ordered Ohio to restore the cut early 
voting period. 
                                                                                                                  
Crawford—More Rhetorical Bark Than Legal Bite?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 2, 
2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/crawford-more-rhetorical-bark-legal-bite. 
 89. On post-Crawford developments, see HASEN, supra note 73, at 308-10. 
 90. For the facts and procedural history described below, see Ohio State Conference of 
NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (granting preliminary injunction), 
stay denied pending appeal, 769 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 2014), aff’d on merits, 768 F.3d 524 (6th 
Cir. 2014), stay granted, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.). 
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Even with the cutbacks, Ohio offered more than the average 
amount of early voting, and many states (such as New York) offered 
no early voting at all. Further, Ohio offered no excuse absentee bal-
loting across the state and sent every single voter an absentee ballot 
application. The judge found African-American voters mistrustful of 
absentee voting and held it not a sufficient substitute for the loss on 
in-person early voting. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit first re-
fused to stay the trial court’s order and later issued an opinion af-
firming the district court. Ohio then sought a stay with the Supreme 
Court. The Court granted the stay, with the four more liberal Justic-
es noting their dissent from the order. There was no written opinion 
or explanation offered by any Justice.91 
2.   North Carolina.  
In North Carolina, plaintiffs filed voting rights and constitutional 
challenges to a number of provisions of the 2013 omnibus law making 
it harder to register and vote.92 The federal government sued as well, 
seeking to also get North Carolina “bailed in” to preclearance under 
section 3 of the Voting Rights Act, a claim which remains pending.93 
The federal district court set a trial date of July 2015, and plaintiffs 
moved for a preliminary injunction to block some of the election 
                                                                                                                  
 91. The Court’s order reads in full: 
Application for stay presented to Justice Kagan and by her referred to  
the Court granted, and the district court’s September 4, 2014, order granting  
a preliminary injunction stayed pending the timely filing and disposition of a 
petition for writ certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, 
this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of  
certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the 
judgment of this Court. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, 
and Justice Kagan would deny the application for stay. 
Ohio State Conference, 135 S. Ct. at 42. Months after the election, the case settled. Rick 
Hasen, Ohio Early Voting Suit Settled, with Elimination of Significant “Golden Week”, 
ELECTION L. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2015, 9:12 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=71807. 
 92. For the facts and procedural history described below, see N.C. State Conference v. 
McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (denying preliminary injunction), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 
224 (4th Cir. 2014) (ordering the trial court to grant a preliminary injunction in order to 
end same-day voter registration and counting of certain out-of-precinct ballots), stayed sub 
nom. North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (mem.) (staying 
Fourth Circuit order and mandate). 
 93. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department to File Lawsuit Against the 
State of North Carolina to Stop Discriminatory Changes to Voting Law (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-file-lawsuit-against-state-north-carolina-
stop-discriminatory-changes (“The complaint asks the court to prohibit North Carolina 
from enforcing these requirements, and also requests that the court order bail-in relief 
under section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act. If granted, this would subject North Carolina to 
a new preclearance requirement.”). 
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changes for the 2014 election season. The voter identification law was 
not yet in effect for 2014, but there was a “soft rollout” set for 2014 
(in which poll workers would ask for identification but not turn peo-
ple away who lacked it). One of the sets of plaintiffs sought to block 
that soft roll out.  
The federal district court denied the preliminary injunction sought 
to enjoin a number of the new voting rules, primarily on grounds that 
based upon the evidence presented thus far, coupled with the judge’s 
views of how to decide section 2 vote denial claims, the plaintiffs were 
not likely to succeed on the merits and did not face irreparable injury. 
Plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit. In a 2-1 vote, the court granted a preliminary in-
junction in part. The injunction was granted only as to two provisions 
of the law, which were the subject of the preliminary injunction mo-
tion: the rollback in early voting and the end of counting ballots cast 
in the wrong precinct. The Fourth Circuit held plaintiffs were likely 
to succeed on their section 2 claims as to these two provisions. The 
dissent, after running through the Winter factors for a preliminary 
injunction, cited Purcell as an additional reason to deny the request.94 
                                                                                                                  
 94. Judge Motz wrote in her dissent:  
While securing reversal of a denial of preliminary relief is an uphill battle 
for any movant, Appellants face a particularly steep challenge here. For “con-
siderations specific to election cases,” including the risk of voter confusion, 
counsel extreme caution when considering preliminary injunctive relief that 
will alter electoral procedures. Because those risks increase “[a]s an election 
draws closer,” so too must a court’s caution. Moreover, election cases like the 
one at hand, in which an appellate court is asked to reverse a district court’s 
denial of a preliminary injunction, risk creating “conflicting orders” which “can 
themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away 
from the polls.”  
League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 250-51 (Motz, J., dissenting) (alteration in 
original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Judge Motz added in a footnote: 
Although the majority steadfastly asserts that the requested injunction 
seeks only to maintain the status quo, the provisions challenged by Appellants 
were enacted more than a year ago and governed the statewide primary elec-
tions held on May 6, 2014. Appellants did not move for a preliminary injunction 
until May 19, 2014, almost two weeks after the new electoral procedures had 
been implemented in the primary. Moreover, regardless of how one conceives of 
the status quo, there is simply no way to characterize the relief requested by 
Appellants as anything but extraordinary. Appellants ask a federal court to or-
der state election officials to abandon their electoral laws without first resolv-
ing the question of the legality of those laws. 
 Id. at 250 n.*. The majority also distinguished Purcell noting that: 
In Purcell, on which the dissenting opinion relies, the Supreme Court 
seemed troubled by the fact that a two-judge motions panel of the Ninth Circuit 
entered a factless, groundless “bare order” enjoining a new voter identification 
provision in an impending election. At the time of the “bare order,” the appel-
late court also lacked findings by the district court. By contrast, neither district 
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North Carolina then asked the Supreme Court to stay the Fourth 
Circuit’s ruling. The Supreme Court stayed the Fourth Circuit’s 
grant of a preliminary injunction, with Justices Ginsburg and  
Sotomayor noting their dissent. The majority again offered no rea-
soning to accompany its order. Justice Ginsburg wrote a four-
paragraph dissent, stating in part that: 
The Court of Appeals determined that at least two of the 
measures—elimination of same-day registration and termination 
of out-of-precinct voting—risked significantly reducing op-
portunities for black voters to exercise the franchise in violation  
of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. I would not displace that record-
based reasoned judgment.95  
Justice Ginsburg did not explain why she would defer to the Court 
of Appeals’ “record-based” judgment over the “record-based” judg-
ment of the trial court.  
3.   Wisconsin.  
In Wisconsin, a federal district court issued a lengthy opinion 
holding that Wisconsin’s strict voter identification law violated both 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.96 
The judge offered a very broad reading of section 2’s application to 
vote denial cases and held that Wisconsin could not implement its 
law or any revised voter identification law without court approval. 
The trial judge concluded that over 300,000 Wisconsin voters lacked 
the proper identification and had no easy way of securing it. 
The State of Wisconsin appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and sought a stay of the district 
court’s order so that it could use the identification requirement in its 
upcoming election. The Seventh Circuit put off the stay request until 
after oral argument in the case, which took place about eight weeks 
before the election. Later, the same day as the oral argument, the 
                                                                                                                  
court nor appellate court reasoning, nor lengthy opinions explaining that rea-
soning, would be lacking in this case. 
Id. at 248 n.6 (citation omitted).  
 95. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. at 6 (Ginsburg, J.,  
dissenting). 
 96. For the facts and procedural history described below, see Frank v. Walker, 17 F. 
Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (holding that Wisconsin’s voter identification law violated 
Voting Rights Act Section 2 and the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and  
enjoining the law’s use in elections), stay granted, 766 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2014), reh’g en 
banc denied by equally divided court, 769 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2014) (per curiam), rev’d, 768 
F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), vacating stay, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (mem.), reh’g en banc denied by 
equally divided court, 773 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2014) (mem.). 
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Seventh Circuit panel in a brief order stayed the trial court’s order 
and allowed the State to move forward with implementing its voter 
identification law pending the outcome of the appeal. 
Plaintiffs sought en banc review in the Seventh Circuit, arguing 
that there was no time to implement the law and get identification 
cards in the hands of all voters that wanted cards before the election. 
The State’s original plan called for an eight-month rollout of the 
identification law in the event it was upheld by the courts. The State 
of Wisconsin conceded in its filings that up to ten percent of the 
state’s voters would be unable to get identification in time for the  
upcoming election, and the problem would be especially acute for 
Wisconsin residents born in another state, who could have delays in 
securing a birth certificate from another state. Further, some voters 
had already received and voted with absentee ballots, but those bal-
lots would not count unless voters supplied new identification  
information. 
The full Seventh Circuit denied the request for an en banc hear-
ing, evenly dividing 5-5 on the request. Judge Williams, for the five 
dissenters, called the order to allow the identification requirement  
to go into immediate effect with the admitted reality of disenfran-
chisement “shocking.”97 The challengers then sought a Supreme 
Court vacation of the Seventh Circuit stay. While the case was being 
briefed at the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit panel, in an opin-
ion by Judge Easterbrook, issued an opinion on the merits, strongly 
rejecting the section 2 and constitutional claims. The full Seventh 
Circuit, upon the request of a judge on the court, then sua sponte 
considered rehearing the panel’s final ruling en banc. That request 
failed again on a 5-5 even vote, with Judge Posner writing a scathing 
                                                                                                                  
 97. Frank, 769 F.3d at 498 (Williams, J., dissenting). Judge Williams, dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc, wrote: 
The district court found that 300,000 registered voters—registered voters,  
not just persons eligible to vote—lack the most common form of identification 
needed to vote in the upcoming elections in Wisconsin. (To put this number in 
context, the 2010 governor’s race in Wisconsin was decided by 124,638 votes 
and the election for United States Senator by 105,041 votes.) And how does the 
state reply to the fact that numerous registered voters do not have qualifying 
identification with elections so imminent? It brazenly responds that the district 
court found that “more than 90% of Wisconsin’s registered voters already have 
a qualifying ID” and can vote and that “the voter ID law will have little impact 
on the vast majority of voters.” But the right to vote is not the province of just 
the majority. It is not just held by those who have cars and so already have 
driver’s licenses and by those who travel and so already have passports. The 
right to vote is also held, and held equally, by all citizens of voting age. It simp-
ly cannot be the answer to say that 90% of registered voters can still vote. To 
say that is to accept the disenfranchisement of 10% of a state’s registered  
voters; for the state to take this position is shocking. 
Id.  
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dissent for the five dissenters. Among other things, Judge Posner 
remarked, “As there is no evidence that voter impersonation fraud is 
a problem, how can the fact that a legislature says it’s a problem turn 
it into one? If the Wisconsin legislature says witches are a problem, 
shall Wisconsin courts be permitted to conduct witch trials?”98 
The Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s stay, with the 
effect of blocking use of Wisconsin’s voter identification law in the 
November 2014 election. Once again, the Court offered no rationale 
for its order. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia, issued a brief dis-
sent which read in full: 
There is a colorable basis for the Court’s decision due to the 
proximity of the upcoming general election. It is particularly trou-
bling that absentee ballots have been sent out without any nota-
tion that proof of photo identification must be submitted. But this 
Court “may not vacate a stay entered by a court of appeals unless 
that court clearly and ‘demonstrably’ erred in its application of  
‘accepted standards.’ ” Under that test, the application in this case 
should be denied.99 
4.   Texas.  
The Texas case also involved a state voter identification law.100 
The federal district court held a lengthy trial to consider section 2 
and constitutional claims against the strict identification law. As in 
North Carolina, the Department of Justice got involved in the case 
and sought to get Texas bailed back into federal preclearance (an  
issue still pending in the case).101 Less than weeks before the start of 
early voting, on October 20, the court issued a 147-page opinion hold-
ing Texas’ law a violation of the Voting Rights Act and the Constitu-
tion, both the Equal Protection Clause and the Twenty-fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition on poll taxes in federal elections. The trial 
court further found that Texas engaged in intentional discrimination 
in voting, a prerequisite to consideration for potential renewed  
preclearance.  
                                                                                                                  
 98. 773 F.3d at 795 (Posner, J., dissenting).  
 99. 135 S. Ct. at 7 (citations omitted). A few months later, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on the merits. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015) (mem.). 
 100. For the facts and procedural history described below, see Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. 
Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014), stayed, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014), denying motion to  
vacate stay, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 101. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department to File New Lawsuit Against 
State of Texas over Voter I.D. Law (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-file-new-lawsuit-against-state-texas-over-voter-id-law (“The complaint asks 
the court to prohibit Texas from enforcing the requirements of its law, and also requests 
that the court order bail-in relief under section 3 of the Voting Rights Act. If granted, this 
would subject Texas to a new preclearance requirement.”). 
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The trial court’s opinion was not clear as to whether its injunction 
in using the identification law went into effect immediately, which 
would stop Texas from continuing to use its voter identification law 
as it had in the 2014 primaries and other elections. The trial court 
then clarified that the law was blocked for the 2014 general election.102 
The State of Texas sought a stay of the trial court’s order from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Cir-
cuit granted the stay, with the effect of allowing Texas to use the 
identification law in the 2014 general election. The Court of Appeals 
refused to consider the merits of the arguments against Texas’ identi-
fication law, stating that the issues were difficult. Although the court 
purported to apply the Nken factors for a stay, it found that Texas 
was likely to succeed on the merits only because the district court 
imposed a stay just before the election in violation of the Purcell 
principle.103 The court looked at the Supreme Court’s recent orders in 
the Ohio, North Carolina, and Texas cases and perceived that the 
Purcell principle was at work in the cases. Given the proximity to the 
election, the Fifth Circuit determined that it was too late for the trial 
court to block the use of Texas’ identification law.  
Plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court to vacate the Fifth Circuit’s 
stay. The Court, once again without explaining its reasoning, refused 
to do so. The Court issued an order with a dissent at 5 a.m. on the 
Saturday morning before the first Monday of early voting in Texas, a 
highly unusual time of day (and unusual day) for the Court to issue a 
                                                                                                                  
 102. Final Judgment, Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 13-CV-
00193), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Veasey689.pdf. 
 103.  
First, the State has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on 
the merits, at least as to its argument that the district court should not have 
changed the voting identification laws on the eve of the election. The court of-
fered no reason for applying the injunction to an election that was just nine 
days away, even though the State repeatedly argued that an injunction this 
close to the election would substantially disrupt the election process. As dis-
cussed in Part III above, the Supreme Court has instructed that we should 
carefully guard against judicially altering the status quo on the eve of an elec-
tion. And, just this term, the Court has stepped in to prevent such alterations 
several times. We find that the State has made a strong showing that the dis-
trict court erred in applying the injunction to this fast-approaching election  
cycle. 
The other questions on the merits are significantly harder to decide, given 
the voluminous record, the lengthy district court opinion, and our necessarily 
expedited review. But, given the special importance of preserving orderly elec-
tions, we find that this factor weighs in favor of issuing a stay. 
769 F.3d at 895. 
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ruling. The dissenters could well have been trying to call attention in 
a dramatic way to the injustice they saw in the Court’s refusal to  
vacate a stay.104 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, issued 
a lengthy dissent. The dissent began by distinguishing the Ohio and 
North Carolina cases and then turned to Purcell: 
Neither application involved, as this case does, a permanent in-
junction following a full trial and resting on an extensive record 
from which the District Court found ballot-access discrimination 
by the State. I would not upset the District Court’s reasoned, rec-
ord-based judgment, which the Fifth Circuit accorded slim, if any, 
deference. Cf. Purcell v. Gonzalez (Court of Appeals erred in failing 
                                                                                                                  
 104. Or so I have suggested. See Richard L. Hasen, Dawn Patrol: Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s Critically Important 5 a.m. Wake-Up Call on Voting Rights, SLATE (Oct. 19, 
2014, 1:05 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/ 
ginsburg_s_dissent_in_texas_voter_id_law_supreme_court_order.html.  
Justice Ginsburg later gave a bit more insight on the timing in an interview with 
NPR’s Nina Totenberg:  
Nina Totenberg: Justice Ginsburg, you were up until . . . Friday 
night/Saturday morning, writing a passionate dissent in the Texas voter id 
case. Just to let people in the audience know, this was a procedural question in 
some measure. And you can note a dissent in those kinds of cases and not write 
and it is fairly common for that to happen. But you wrote; you were joined by 
Justices Kagan and Sotomayor. So why did you write and why did it take until 
5 in the morning? 
Justice Ginsburg: Why till 5 in the morning? We didn’t get the last filing 
from Texas until Friday morning and then the Circuit Justice [Justice Scalia  
in this case] as you know has to write a memo. And that came around some 
time in the middle of the afternoon. So there wasn’t much time to write the  
dissent. I had written a dissent in the North Carolina voting case, voting rights  
case. This one was . . . I would say it was very well-reasoned. You called it  
passionate. 
Nina Totenberg: The point you were making . . . to explain a fact of law here 
is that in 2006 the Supreme Court issued a decision that basically said we try 
not to disturb what’s going on in an election right before an election because 
people will get confused. And you said you did not think that applied here. 
Why? 
Justice Ginsburg: First this case was unlike others because it had gone 
through a complete 9 day trial, reams of evidence, and an excellent decision 
written by the district court. This was a new system for Texas. From 2003-
2013, they have a voter id that was reasonable. There were many things you 
could present. The new law cut back drastically on that. There had never been 
a federal election held under the new law. There had been local elections with 
very small turnout. So the poll watchers [workers?-Ed] were more familiar with 
old procedur[e]. So I didn’t think this case fell into the mold of we can’t disturb 
an election. There had been very little in the way of educational efforts, so that 
people knew what the new law required, so that the poll watchers would know. 
So I thought that the old system would involve less disruption than this never-
done-in-a-federal-election-before [system]. 
Rick Hasen, Justice Ginsburg Tells Nina Totenberg About 5 AM Texas Voter ID Decision, 
ELECTION L. BLOG (Oct. 19, 2014, 5:11 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=67123. 
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to accord deference to “the ruling and findings of the District 
Court”). The fact-intensive nature of this case does not justify the 
Court of Appeals’ stay order; to the contrary, the Fifth Circuit’s re-
fusal to home in on the facts found by the District Court is precise-
ly why this Court should vacate the stay. 
Refusing to evaluate defendants’ likelihood of success on the 
merits and, instead, relying exclusively on the potential disruption 
of Texas’ electoral processes, the Fifth Circuit showed little respect 
for this Court’s established stay standards. See Nken v. Holder 
(“most critical” factors in evaluating request for a stay are appli-
cant’s likelihood of success on the merits and whether applicant 
would suffer irreparable injury absent a stay). Purcell held only 
that courts must take careful account of considerations specific to 
election cases, not that election cases are exempt from traditional 
stay standards.105  
The remainder of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent disputed the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning that a stay would disrupt Texas’ election processes. 
True, in Purcell and in recent rulings on applications involving 
voting procedures, this Court declined to upset a State’s electoral 
apparatus close to an election. Since November 2013, however, 
when the District Court established an expedited schedule for res-
olution of this case, Texas knew full well that the court would is-
sue its ruling only weeks away from the election. The State thus 
had time to prepare for the prospect of an order barring the en-
forcement of [the law]. Of greater significance, the District Court 
found “woefully lacking” and “grossly” underfunded the State’s ef-
forts to familiarize the public and poll workers regarding the new 
identification requirements.106 
The remainder of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reviewed the trial 
court’s evidence that the law had a discriminatory purpose and would 
have a discriminatory impact on minority voters.107  
The potential magnitude of racially discriminatory voter disen-
franchisement counseled hesitation before disturbing the District 
Court’s findings and final judgment. Senate Bill 14 may prevent 
                                                                                                                  
 105. Veasey, 135 S. Ct. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (partial citations omitted).  
 106. Id. Justice Ginsburg added: 
Furthermore, after the District Court’s injunction issued and despite the 
State’s application to the Court of Appeals for a stay, Texas stopped issuing al-
ternative “election identification certificates” and completely removed mention 
of [the law’s] requirements from government Web sites. In short, any voter con-
fusion or lack of public confidence in Texas’ electoral processes is in this case 
largely attributable to the State itself. 
Id. at 10-11 (citation omitted). 
 107. Id. at 11-12. Justice Ginsburg also noted that the district court held the law was 
an unconstitutional poll tax, an issue not presented in the other 2014 election cases. Id.  
at 12. 
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more than 600,000 registered Texas voters (about 4.5% of all regis-
tered voters) from voting in person for lack of compliant identifica-
tion. A sharply disproportionate percentage of those voters are Af-
rican-American or Hispanic.108 
C.   Freeing the 2014 Election Cases of the Purcell Principle 
I cannot say for certain that rigid application of the Purcell princi-
ple is responsible for the Supreme Court orders in the 2014 election 
cases. The Court majority in each case did not give a word of reasons 
for its orders. We do not even know if additional Justices dissented 
but chose not to note their dissents in the North Carolina, Wisconsin, 
or Texas cases.109 But Justice Alito’s110 and Justice Ginsburg’s111 dis-
sents certainly make it appear that Purcell was behind the Court’s 
orders. This is also how the Fifth Circuit understood the cases when 
it considered a stay of the Texas order112 and how I understood the 
cases113 while they were in progress. 
Properly applying the standards from the Court’s general rules for 
considering emergency relief, there is a strong argument that the 
Court reached the right result in the Ohio and Wisconsin cases. 
North Carolina is a closer case. The Court’s decision in the Texas 
case appears incorrect. 
1.   Ohio. 
The Court was correct to stay the trial court’s order in the Ohio 
case. Challengers seemed unlikely to succeed on the merits in the 
Supreme Court, despite winning in the courts below. While the pre-
                                                                                                                  
 108. Id. (citation omitted). 
 109. In Ohio, there were four noted dissents, so no other Justices could have dissented. 
Husted v. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.).   
 110. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 111. Veasey, 135 S. Ct. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 112. Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 897 (5th Cir. 2014) (Costa, J., concurring) (“I agree 
with Judge Clement that the only constant principle that can be discerned from the Su-
preme Court’s recent decisions in this area is that its concern about confusion resulting 
from court changes to election laws close in time to the election should carry the day in the 
stay analysis. The injunction in this case issued even closer in time to the upcoming elec-
tion than did the two out of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits that the Supreme Court recently 
stayed. On that limited basis, I agree a stay should issue.”). 
 113. Richard L. Hasen, How to Predict a Voting Rights Decision: The Supreme 
Court Just Made It Harder to Vote in Some States and Easier in Others, SLATE (Oct. 10, 
2014, 10:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/ 
supreme_court_voting_rights_decisions_contradictions_in_wisconsin_ohio_north.html 
(“But there is a consistent theme in the court’s actions, which we can call the ‘Purcell prin-
ciple’ after the 2006 Supreme Court case Purcell v. Gonzalez: Lower courts should be very 
reluctant to change the rules just before an election, because of the risk of voter confusion 
and chaos for election officials. The Texas case may raise the hardest issue under the  
Purcell principle, and how it gets resolved will matter a lot for these types of election  
challenges going forward.”). 
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cise application of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to vote denial 
cases remains up in the air,114 it is doubtful that the conservative  
Supreme Court—the same court which recently hobbled section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act in the Shelby County case and has displayed 
routine skepticism and hostility toward race-based claims—would 
read the Voting Rights Act so expansively as to cover a jurisdiction’s 
cutback of early voting from five weeks to four weeks, especially 
when the jurisdiction sent every voter in the state an application  
for a no-excuse absentee ballot to be voted during the early voting 
period. Even with proof that African-American voters in Ohio used 
early voting, and especially “Golden Week,” more than white voters, 
the current Supreme Court is quite unlikely to hold that the Ohio 
legislature’s cutback in early voting, which makes it marginally more 
difficult to cast a vote and has a disparate impact on minority voters, 
deprives minority voters of an opportunity to participate in the politi-
cal process and to elect representatives of their choice.  
This lack of a major burden on voters also factors into the balance 
of hardships to the parties, another key part of the Rostker test  
for stays and related tests. Ohio voters deprived of the extra week  
to vote have other ample ways to cast a vote. The State’s burden of 
adding an extra week is small as well, requiring additional personnel 
and administration.   
Finally, the public interest does not cut strongly in one direction. 
On the one hand, expanding opportunities to vote can serve the  
public interest. On the other hand, the public has an interest in effi-
cient administration of elections, and adding back the week would 
impose additional costs. Of course, the timing close to the election 
(the Purcell principle) cuts against a late court order to change election 
timing. 
Given the weakness of the merits on the plaintiffs’ side, the Court 
seemed correct in staying the lower court. The Purcell factor reinforc-
es this decision. 
2.   Wisconsin.  
The Supreme Court also seemed correct in its decision in the Wis-
consin case, vacating the Seventh Circuit stay which would have  
had the effect of allowing the State of Wisconsin to immediately  
implement its voter identification law.115 This case was a no-brainer 
for reversal. The State admitted that such a precipitous implementa-
tion of its law would disenfranchise up to ten percent of the state’s 
population, especially residents born out of state who would have  
                                                                                                                  
 114. See HASEN, supra note 73, at 288-92. 
 115. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014).  
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difficulty getting the right documentation in time, and put burdens 
on those voters who had already received their absentee ballots 
which, if the law were implemented, would not be counted unless the 
voters produced identification—something not required by the original 
instructions.116 
Putting aside whether Wisconsin’s voter identification law as a 
whole was likely to be found by the Supreme Court to violate either 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution’s Equal Protec-
tion Clause, there was no real question that the immediate imple-
mentation of the law would violate both, by disenfranchising voters 
for no compelling reason, and with that burden falling disproportion-
ately on minority voters. Aside from the likelihood of convincing the 
Supreme Court that the precipitous disenfranchisement was likely 
illegal, the relative burdens faced by the parties tilted heavily in fa-
vor of the challengers. On the one side were the many voters who 
would be disenfranchised when a rollout planned for eight months 
was compressed into a few weeks. On the other hand, the State pos-
ited an interest in preventing voter fraud, which was totally hypo-
thetical and unproven.117 As in other states, Wisconsin could not 
point to significant instances of voter impersonation fraud which 
would justify imposing such a law at all,118 much less imposing such a 
law on a truncated schedule. Many members of the public who were 
not plaintiffs stood the risk of being disenfranchised, tilting the pub-
lic interest in Wisconsin’s favor. Finally, the Purcell principle seemed 
to have strong application here, with a change just before the election 
likely to both confuse voters and put new burdens on election  
administrators. 
Even accepting Justice Alito and Justice Scalia’s statement in the 
Wisconsin case dissent that the Court should apply the “demonstra-
ble error” standard in determining whether to vacate a stay imposed 
by a Court of Appeals,119 the Wisconsin case—with its certainty of 
disenfranchisement, lack of strong government interest in immediate 
implementation of its law, and timing so close to the election as to 
risk both voter confusion and election administrator chaos—meets 
the standard. It is troubling that these dissenting Justices would tol-
erate certain disenfranchisement out of deference to the Court of Ap-
peals, an appellate court which, considering the issue en banc twice, 
split evenly on the question.  
                                                                                                                  
 116. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 853-62 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 
(7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015) (mem.). 
 117. Id. at 847.   
 118. Id. at 847-48. 
 119. 135 S. Ct. at 7 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
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3.   North Carolina.  
North Carolina presents a closer case on the Supreme Court’s de-
cision to stay the Fourth Circuit’s order putting North Carolina’s end 
of same-day voter registration and out-of-precinct voting on hold.120 
Compared to Ohio, North Carolina’s case presented both more evi-
dence of a disparate effect of legislative rollbacks of voting rights as 
well as a more nuanced understanding of the scope of section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act. It is not at all clear that the Supreme Court will 
agree with the Fourth Circuit’s views on the facts and the law, but 
the Fourth Circuit’s analysis was nuanced and careful, with the  
potential to be affirmed on the merits. Further, the burdens on voters 
in North Carolina appeared more significant than the modest cut-
back in early voting days in Ohio. 
On the other hand, North Carolina voters still had many other  
opportunities to vote.121 Further, as noted by the Fourth Circuit dis-
sent,122 making these changes close to the election burdened election 
administrators: the State had already set out its procedures for vot-
ing, and this change would mean new instructions in the period just 
before the election.123  
In such a close case, arguably, the Supreme Court should have de-
ferred to the Fourth Circuit’s decision to grant the narrow prelimi-
nary injunction in North Carolina. Deference seems to make the most 
sense in close cases. Or perhaps the Court should have deferred to 
the district court, which actually considered the evidence first. Recall 
that in Purcell, the Supreme Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for 
lack of deference to the decision of the district court not to grant a 
preliminary injunction.124 The Court’s rules on which court deserves 
deference remain uncertain and underdeveloped. 
4.   Texas.  
The Court erred in failing to vacate the Fifth Circuit’s stay, even 
applying the “demonstrable error” standard of review.125 As Justice 
                                                                                                                  
 120. North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014). 
 121. Despite the loss of same-day voter registration and cutbacks in early voting, the 
amount of early voting actually increased in 2014 compared to the 2010 midterm election, 
especially among Democrats. Nate Cohn, For Democrats, Turnout Efforts Look Successful 
(Though Not Elections), N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/ 
upshot/evaluating-the-success-of-democratic-get-out-the-vote-efforts.html?_r=0 (“Since 2010, 
turnout increased by 14 percent in North Carolina counties that voted for President 
Obama, but just 4 percent in counties that voted for Mitt Romney.”). 
 122. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 249 (4th Cir. 
2014) (Motz, J., dissenting).  
 123. Id. at 252-53. 
 124. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).  
 125. Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014).  
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Ginsburg pointed out in dissent, the court failed to properly apply the 
Nken standard to consider whether or not to stay the district court 
order enjoining Texas’ continued use of its voter identification law.126 
Instead, the Fifth Circuit decided the question of a stay solely as a 
matter of timing under the Purcell principle.127 
By failing to properly apply the Nken standard, the Court of Ap-
peals never examined the likelihood of success on the merits or the 
relative hardship of the parties.128 With the Court of Appeals failing 
to examine the merits, it (and the Supreme Court) should have de-
ferred on the facts to the trial court, which held a full trial. The trial 
court determined not only that the law was likely to have a disparate 
impact on minority voters but also that the Texas legislature passed 
the law with racially discriminatory intent.129 Further, the trial court 
determined the law was an unconstitutional poll tax because of the 
costs associated with getting needed documentation.130 
Whether or not the Supreme Court would likely agree with the 
district court’s more expansive reading of section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, or the Twen-
ty-Fourth Amendment, it should have deferred to the district court 
given the finding of intentional racial intent. There is no question 
that voting laws passed with a racially discriminatory purpose can 
violate both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Further, 
factual findings of trial courts, such as the district court’s finding of 
racially discriminatory purpose, are entitled to considerable defer-
ence unless they are clearly erroneous. The Fifth Circuit not only 
failed to reject the trial court’s factual finding on this point as clearly 
erroneous—it refused to examine the record on the question when 
deciding to stay the trial court’s injunction. 
The Fifth Circuit also failed to meaningfully consider the irrepa-
rable harm to the parties or the public interest aside from application 
of the Purcell principle. The trial court’s factual finding that up to 
600,000 Texans lacked the right kind of identification and could not 
easily receive it would be a factual finding entitled to deference un-
less clearly erroneous. This large risk of disenfranchisement would 
                                                                                                                  
 126. Id. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 127. See Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 892-95 (5th Cir. 2014).  
 128. The Fifth Circuit held that the state would be irreparably harmed if it could not 
enforce its laws. Id. at 895. It then said that the individual voter plaintiffs “may be 
harmed” by the stay, but then in a footnote backpedaled: “The State contends that no indi-
vidual voter plaintiffs would actually be harmed by a stay. But, at this time, we decline to 
decide the fact-intensive question of which individual voter plaintiffs would be harmed.” Id. 
at 896 & n.4. The failure to engage with the facts makes the balancing the court purported 
to engage in meaningless. 
 129. Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 695-703 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
 130. Id. at 703-07. 
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have to be balanced against the State’s interest in preventing voter 
fraud. And here, once again, the Court of Appeals did not address, 
much less find clearly erroneous, the district court’s factual finding 
that there was no significant evidence of impersonation fraud to sup-
port Texas’ voter identification law and that claims of fraud were a 
pretext for unconstitutional discrimination. 
Faced with such a record, the Supreme Court in the Texas case 
should have sided with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent and put Texas’ 
voter identification law on hold until the Fifth Circuit (and potential-
ly the Supreme Court) could fully review the factual findings and  
legal conclusions the district court made after a full trial on the mer-
its. Leaving the decision to hang solely on the Purcell principle risked 
the disenfranchisement of voters without good reason and violated 
the Court’s own stated standards for determining whether to vacate a 
stay imposed by a court of appeals. 
IV.   GIVING REASONS (AFTER THE FACT) IN  
EMERGENCY (ELECTION) CASES 
Whether or not the Supreme Court in reviewing emergency elec-
tion cases is going to rein in the Purcell principle in order to apply 
the Court’s more general standards for granting or denying emergen-
cy relief, the Court should give lower courts and the public a fuller 
explanation for its actions. An explanation could come weeks or 
months after the Court issues an emergency order in the form of a 
separate opinion or set of opinions, much like the practice of some 
state supreme courts in dealing with emergency election litigation. 
State supreme courts,131 federal district courts,132 and federal courts 
of appeal133 have followed this practice. 
                                                                                                                  
 131. See, e.g., Malnar v. Joice, 337 P.3d 43, 44 (Ariz. 2014) (“We previously issued an 
order affirming the superior court’s removal of Elizabeth Joice’s name from the 2014  
general election ballot for a vacant term on the Peoria Unified School District Governing 
Board. This opinion explains our reasoning.”). 
 132. For example, Judge O’Malley of the Northern District of Ohio wrote:  
After careful consideration, while, for reasons that will be explained in de-
tail in the Court’s forthcoming memorandum opinion in this matter, the Court 
ultimately rejects both parties’ legal theories, it orders implementation of one of 
the Board’s alternative remedies: limited voting. The Court issues this sum-
mary order now to accommodate the concerns expressed by the Board of Elec-
tions and to provide the parties with guidance as to how to prepare for this 
fall’s upcoming Board elections. The Court will explain the full rationale for 
reaching this result in the opinion that will issue shortly. 
Order at 3, United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ohio 2009) 
(No. 08-CV-2832), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/euclid-order.pdf.  
 133. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Gessler, 773 F.3d 200, 202 n.1 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We 
held oral argument on October 7 and issued an interim order on October 14. This opinion 
explains the basis of that order and does not consider events occurring after October 14.”); 
Voting for Am., Inc. v. Andrade, 488 F. App’x 890, 891 (5th Cir. 2012) (“On September 6, 
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There is even Supreme Court precedent for doing so. In 1942, the 
Supreme Court considered habeas corpus petitions involving the  
detention of German citizens during World War II. In Ex Parte  
Quirin,134 the Court issued an order in the case, following it up a few 
months later with an explanatory opinion.135 But the Court has not 
followed that practice, either in Bush v. Gore or in the 2014 election 
cases, when the press of time made an immediate decision, but not 
full opinion, necessary.  
It is possible that many of the criticisms of the logic and argument 
of Bush v. Gore could have been avoided if the Court had more time 
to work on the opinion. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in the Bush v. 
Gore majority, later told journalist Jan Crawford Greenburg: “I don’t 
think what emerged in the last opinion was the Court’s best effort. It 
was operating under a very short time frame, to say the least. Given 
more time, I think we probably would’ve done better.”136 Similarly, 
Justice Kennedy, also in the majority, told Greenburg, “The problem 
with Bush v. Gore was that it came so fast, it had to be decided so 
fast.”137 
The benefits of giving reasons are many.138 Reasons will help lower 
courts use the right standards in election cases, rather than having 
to try to read tea leaves from unexplained Court orders. Following 
the Court’s normal procedural regularity in election cases will bolster 
the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the public, something espe-
cially important in controversial cases, such as election cases.139 Fol-
lowing usual and articulated rules may also discipline Justices into 
deciding similar cases alike, regardless of the identity of the parties. 
Giving reasons imposes three significant costs as well. First, it 
imposes time costs on the Justices, who often have to put aside their 
work on the Court’s normal caseload to deal with these emergency 
                                                                                                                  
2012, we entered an order granting Appellant Texas Secretary of State Hope Andrade’s 
Emergency Motion to Stay the district court’s Order (as modified) granting in part a pre-
liminary injunction against the enforcement of certain Texas statutes and stating that 
reasons would be assigned later. Those reasons follow.”). 
 134. 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (per curiam).  
 135. Id. at 20 (“On July 31, 1942, after hearing argument of counsel and after full con-
sideration of all questions raised, this Court affirmed the orders of the District Court and 
denied petitioners’ applications for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus. By per curiam 
opinion we announced the decision of the Court, and that the full opinion in the causes 
would be prepared and filed with the Clerk.”) (citation omitted).  
 136. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 175 (2007). 
 137. Id.  
 138. See generally Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995) 
(exploring the logic of giving reasons). 
 139. See Baude, supra note 27, at 9-15 (noting the benefits of procedural regularity and 
legitimacy in Court decision-making). 
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motions in the first place. However, if the Court could work on these 
cases when not up against pressing deadlines, it could issue an opin-
ion with reasons even months after a decision.   
Second, giving reasons could cause the Court to decide issues it 
would rather avoid or would prefer to resolve in another case with a 
better-developed factual record. This is a genuine concern. Having 
the Court decide the full scope of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 
vote denial cases based on the relatively spare record in some of 
these cases could lead the Court to make poor decisions which it 
could avoid in reviewing a more fully formed case. The Court can deal 
with this problem in a few ways: asking for supplemental briefing, 
remanding for additional fact-finding, or issuing an opinion that lim-
its the Court’s precedential holding, explaining that the Court may 
view the legal issue differently when presented more fully in a sub-
sequent case. 
Finally, forcing the Court to give reasons may make it more diffi-
cult for the Court to reach prudential decisions of compromise in 
these cases. As noted, both Purcell and Wheaton might be viewed as 
cases in which the Court wanted to preserve the status quo and put 
issues off for another time. Further, Justices Breyer and Kagan 
might not have (publicly) dissented in the North Carolina case in 
hopes that such restraint could induce the Chief Justice and Justice 
Kennedy not to dissent (or publicly dissent) in the Wisconsin case. 
This kind of tacit compromise or horse trading is, of course, specula-
tion.140 But if such prudential/political considerations are going into 
how the Court decides some of these controversial, high profile cases, 
reason-giving could act as a deterrent. If Justices Breyer and Kagan 
have to explain their votes in the North Carolina case, they may 
change how they vote.  
While these are real costs, they are ultimately outweighed by the 
duty of the Court to explain its actions in a democracy and the poten-
tial that reason-giving will lead the Court to make more consistent 
decisions and bolster the Court’s legitimacy. We vest the Court with 
great power over everything from elections to abortion, gay marriage 
and health care. Every important issue comes before the Court, and 
it is often the last word in how these cases are decided. The Court 
owes us, and itself, explanations when it takes important actions that 
broadly affect U.S. life and liberty and the strength of American  
democracy. 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
The Purcell principle is an important one which should be consid-
ered any time a court is asked to intervene close to an election: courts 
should weigh the risk of voter confusion and the burdens on election 
administrators when courts make changes to election rules close to 
an election. 
Purcell should not be a stand-alone principle, but the Supreme 
Court’s silence in the 2014 election cases threatens to make it one. 
Instead, the Court should clarify that the Purcell principle is part of 
the public interest factor which courts should consider along with 
likelihood of success on the merits, relative hardship to the parties, 
and appropriate deference to lower courts in deciding whether to 
grant a stay or other emergency relief in an election case. Had the 
Court properly applied its usual test in the 2014 election cases, it 
would have blocked Texas’ voter identification law from being used in 
the 2014 election, as Justice Ginsburg urged in her dissent. The 
Court perhaps would have reached a different conclusion in the 
North Carolina voting case as well. 
Finally, the Court should issue opinions, even months after the 
fact, explaining its reasoning in the election cases. Such opinions will 
increase the Court’s legitimacy in deciding controversial election  
issues and could discipline the Court to apply consistent legal stand-
ards to requests for emergency relief. 
